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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Perspectives for Intelligence 1975 - 1980

1. I do not have any real problems with the substantive estimates of the nature of our intelligence problem in the years 1975 to 1980, except that I noted on page 4 the absence of any mention of the Soviet political offensive in Europe and possibly NE and WH. It seems that the Soviets are making unprecedented attempts to strengthen their political action thrust, particularly in Europe, a move that is largely unnoticed and uncontested by this government.

2. In Part III - Implications for Intelligence Planning - the paper becomes more difficult to follow. The paper appears to recommend advanced technical systems for analysis and production to the ultimate users of intelligence, designed to handle increasingly large amounts of raw intelligence. While new methods may indeed be needed, it has seemed to me the problems in this regard in the past few years have stemmed not so much from a lack of gimmicks and systems in presentation as they have from the lack of courage to make decisions and warn policy makers on the basis of information available. No new systems nor methods will help to any measurable degree, unless the people employing them have the courage to disregard preconceived ideas and concepts when available intelligence indicates this is necessary.

3. In paragraph 8 of Part III there is a discussion of possible greater efficiencies in the field of national/tactical interface. The paper says current studies seek to identify ways by which national programs can more directly support tactical requirements and vice versa. It would seem to me that we have long passed the day when the assets of this Agency's Stations will ever be realistically employed under tactical commanders. I would hate to see the operational focus this Directorate has finally achieved after years of diffusion of effort thrown out of gear by being required to satisfy tactical requirements.


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4. Paragraph 9 of Part III makes the point that costly and risky clandestine techniques must only be employed if overt sources cannot be successful in obtaining needed information. This is one of the first times I have seen this obvious need highlighted in a paper of this type. Obviously, I agree very strongly, for I feel one of the greatest weaknesses in the tasking and requirements system today is the absence of any body or group to make this distinction when serving requirements on the overt as opposed to covert collectors.

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William E. Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations

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